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What do images want? Towards an 
Economy of the Image in the Age of 
Digital Envisioning
  Abstract 
The technology of our private portable screens has 
silently engendered a new visual presence, a technical 
image, that reaches out to all other kinds of screens, 
including the traditional screen of painting. The way an 
image appears to us through digital formats, is more 
aptly described as an envisioning, facilitated by light 
emitting diodes that irradiate the eye, while at the 
same time beckoning touch through an interactive 
surface.Villem Flusser claims that these ‘technical 
images' are technically not images, but symptoms of 
electronic processes driven by a convergence of visual 
observation, conceptual categorisation and computing 
touch. Consequently the technical image is not like 
anything that has preceded it, from the cave to the 
cinema, since envisioning is facilitated by a swarm of 
electronic points in a state of decay, closer to a yawning 
emptiness than a physical presence. In this paper I will 
develop an economy of the contemporary image by way 
of Flusser and Friedrich Kittler, arguing that technical 
images have moved out beyond all previous means for 
understanding images, cutting aesthetics, philosophy 
and contemporary art off from the previous age of 
images and their productive or communicative projects.  
As such the contemporary image is caught somewhere 
between being and non-being. The image as semblance 
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is less than a being because if semblance were to fully 
resemble its model then it would no longer be an image 
but that indicated being. At the same time any kind of 
'appearing as non being' given by the image has its 
own kind of being that cuts across the division of being-
non-being. The result, by way of Heidegger is that 
technical images bring all visualisation into an essential 
closeness, a deseverance, that does not make images 
more intimate or understood, on the contrary, images 
become conceptually and phenomenally distant like 
looking glasses, equipment to be looked 'through' but 
not 'at'. By treating images in this way, as optical holes 
instead of dithering presences, something of the 
gigantic nature of our global technologies of envisioning 
are revealed, bringing with them an annihilating 
distance flung to the greatest point of removal beyond 
embodied experiences and discursive formations. 
Author Keywords 
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Introduction 
In the darkness a person is deeply engaged with their 
phone, the light from the screen projects onto their 
face as if both are preparing to engage in an intimate 
transaction.  
What are they looking at? Could it be said to be an 
image? The way the device glows it looks more like the 
phone is looking at the person, as intensely and 
intently as the person looks back. They appear almost 
as lovers in a visual embrace. If the glowing phone is 
the carrier of an image, what is it an image of?  
As Jonathan Crary suggests about many forms of 
contemporary technology, it is less about the image 
than it is “the positioning of the subject within the 
technological space where the (putative) image 
appears.”1 Only occasionally does a phone attempt to 
capture an image of reality as a photograph or video. 
The realism of the phone and its rectangular shaped 
liquid crystal display is not one of a mirroring or 
mimesis but the way it captures the contemporary now, 
how the phone functions as “the mediator of all 
relations.”2   
Is ‘image’ even the right word for what appears on the 
LCD display? Isn’t it more a schematic made up of 
layers of communication events, occurring between the 
visual front end and hardware back end, comprised of 
graphic interfaces and embedded microprocessors that 
only occasionally deliver something close to an image? 
Before I can go any further I need to ask the most 
basic of all questions, what is an image? With so many 
histories of the image, so many ways of imaging and 
being imaged, where to begin?   
Ontology of the Image 
John Lechte lists a broad array of types of images, they 
can be “pictographic, photographic, painterly, 
cinematographic, televisual, videographic.”3 James 
Elkins gets more specific and lists some unusual types 
of image, “virtual-reality reconstructions in legal cases, 
linguistic inquiries into historical uses of colour terms, 
emblems used in economics, visualizations of viruses, 
programs that graphically monitor intranets, image-
based exercises in occupational therapy, multispectral 
imaging in aerial surveying, radio astronomy images of 
stars, visual solutions to mathematical problems, 
studies of the deformations of grain in sandstone, 
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kidney pathologies, images of the sea floor using side 
scanning sonar.”4  
Despite the dizzying array of ways an image can arrive, 
from traditional substrate to technological platforms, 
they all share a kind of split reality, where there is a 
physical tension between the image as an object and 
what it depicts. Heidegger makes this clear in his 
discussion of a picture postcard of the Weidenhauser 
Bridge: 
“I can look at a picture postcard of the Bridge. What is 
bodily given is the postcard itself. The card itself is a 
thing, an object, just as much as the bridge or a tree. 
But it is not a simple thing like the bridge. It is a 
picture thing. In perceiving it, I see through what is 
pictured, (to) the bridge. (…) In the consciousness of a 
picture there is the picture-thing and the pictured.”5  
The image or ‘picture-thing’ is the substrate or 
medium, in the case of the postcard it is paper and ink, 
while the pictured is the bridge. In the case of the 
phone the picture-thing is the LCD screen comprised of 
pixels and diodes. In both cases the being of the 
substrate is manifest while the being of the depicted is 
entirely in doubt, since it may be an image of 
something that does not exist as in a fraudulent or 
imaginary image. As such the image is caught 
somewhere between being and non-being. As Blanchot 
and Nancy put it: “the image appears upon the absence 
of the thing”6 whereby, “the absence of the imaged 
subject is nothing other than an intense presence.”7  
The image is a mode of contact with the imaged, it is a 
pathway from looking, to the presence of the thing in 
its very absence. The image withdraws so that the 
absent can appear, the paper and ink withdraw so the 
bridge can appear. In so doing “the image never stops 
tightening and condensing into itself”8 while at the 
same time generating “a force that forces form to touch 
itself.”9  
Metaphysical Image 
Ontologically the image is split between the picture-
thing and the de-picted.10 However in previous ages 
there was a type of image in which there was no split 
between picture and what was depicted. This happened 
in the representation of gods, where a sculpture or a 
painting could in certain situations be coincident with 
the presence of Christ or Zeus.  
This kind of discussion about the image could get you 
killed in the 8th Century during the period of Byzantine 
Iconoclasm. Iconoclasts attacked as idolatrous and 
sacrilegious any notion that icons, or images of Christ, 
could depict or be co-substantial with Christ’s divinity. 
Against that iconophiles argued that Christ was both 
human and divine and so images of him could be both 
worldly and divine at the same time. Additionally they 
believed that the act of looking is doubled in the icon, 
since as divine, the image literally looks back at us, the 
divine contemplates us through the icon.11  
This special economy of relations in the icon extends to 
the presence of the subject, Christ himself. He may 
manifest in the painting by virtue of the artist’s 
technical skill, but at the same time, “Christ never 
stops withdrawing.”12 That is, He is only “present to the 
extent that the icon is the mark of His absence.”13 This 
kind of split between presence and absence, a ‘pres-
absentiality’, already sketched by Heidegger and 
Blanchot, is crucial to any image from this time to the 
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present, such that we might say that iconic images of 
“Christ becomes the prototype for every image.”14 
Marie-Jose Mondzain introduces the radically bland 
word ‘economy’15 as the primary tool to describe the 
management of the crucial relation between sacred and 
profane images, between image, icon and idol. At the 
heart of the economy is the mystery and ultimate 
enigma of the image. To mismanage this economy is to 
risk damnation, since it is to confuse natural and 
artificial images, the true and the false. As the Old 
Testament exhorts "Thou shalt not make unto thee any 
graven image"16 and “Thou shalt not bow down to them 
or worship them.”17 Yet images are an important part of 
the economy since “God made man in the image of 
God”18 and Jesus is “the Son as image of the Father.”19 
Both are instances of the invisible, God and divinity, 
being made visible, establishing a consubstantiality 
between an image and its impossible and invisible 
model.20 The original image is the divine since God is 
the model of man and son, hence “the model of every 
image.”21 “The (…) image of the (Godly) Father and the 
human (icon) image of the Son are one and the same 
image, in the sense that the relation ‘son of’ is 
equivalent to the relation ‘image of.’”22 There is no 
semiotics of the image here, no forest of signs since 
“the image is everywhere a figure of immanence ... a 
relation of essential similitude.”23 The image re-joins 
the image, resembles an absent and invisible image, 
and is made flesh.24  
Conversely flesh can be transfigured into image, as in 
the veil of Veronica in the moment she wiped the blood 
and sweat from the face of Jesus on his way to Calvary. 
His image was then miraculously imprinted on the cloth 
and is commemorated by the Sixth Station of the Cross 
and works of art based on it. The icon then mediates 
between two extreme terms, the “human and divine 
(…) without mixing them together or altering them.”25  
The icon then presents “the grace of an absence within 
a system of graphic representation (where) Christ is 
not the icon”26 but precisely that part of the image 
which “never stops withdrawing.”27 It is this paradoxical 
visibility of the invisible that will become a hall mark of 
great art even up to our own time. As Mondzain puts it, 
“the greatest western pictorial works of art also  
necessarily concern an existential relation to the 
presence of an emptiness.”28 The grapheme, or basic 
graphic unit in iconic art is “the line as an edge where 
being begins … a graphic fissure …(that) marks the 
visible limits of the void … (and) will never be a 
perimeter.”29 Ultimately “the figure is only there in 
order to show the emptiness and absence of what it 
indicates to the gaze.”30 
As in the veil we come to understand that whatever 
Christ touches “becomes his graphic trace”31, a type of 
writing with light that prefigures modern photography 
and all those technologies based on it that lead up to 
the smart phone.32 The annunciatory relationship with 
the mobile phone incarnates an invisible economy held 
between the flesh (of the hand) and technology (that 
glows out of an incandescent LCD screen). The screen 
of the phone becomes a contemporary icon, a visual 
transfiguration of an invisible real that continues to 
withdraw and never represents. In gazing at the screen 
we are not simply connecting with others or searching 
for information but feeling “the pressure of a light 
producing gaze.”33 The image on the screen of the 
phone becomes the “womb of the invisible … from 
which all future images will be born.”34 By means of 
stabbing fingers and voice recognition the image 
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pronounces itself somewhere between my body and the 
technological interface. The power of the phone, the 
importance of it in our lives, is “nothing other than the 
appropriation of iconic authority and its symbolic 
fertility.”35  
Written texts can also evoke images in the act of 
rhetorical persuasion, Aristotle even claims that “all 
human thought takes place in and through images.”36 
Similarly sculpture can transcend the division between 
image and object, flesh and the inanimate, to evoke a 
symbolic authority similar to a painted icon. In classical 
Greek sculpture there are works where marble is “so 
vividly lifelike” a viewer might feel themselves to be “in 
the presence of (…)  a living being: (with) its power to 
feel, speak and weep.”37 Through artistic technical 
refinement the work captures a vivid likeness that 
stuns the viewer into a type of hypnosis transfiguring 
marble into the overwhelming presence of what is 
manifestly absent. Caroline Van Eck describes this as 
‘animacy’ “endowing stone with the illusion of pulsating 
life … (which) makes the viewer (…) believe she looks 
at living beings instead of their representation.”38  
Eck’s notion of animacy is derived from two related 
Greek terms enargeia (vividness) and energiea 
(actuality).39 These can indicate a form of mimesis 
“that is not based on lifelikeness”40 or the technical skill 
of the artist, but rather an ikonopoiesis between the 
viewers look and the activation of life in the depicted 
entity. She traces the derivation of enargeia back to 
Homer in the Odyssey who uses it to describe “the 
blinding light in which the gods appear to mortals.”41 
Consequently animacy can occur even in a statue 
roughly hewn, or partially destroyed like Scopas’ 
Bacchante (c 380 BC). As the ancient Greek sophist 
Callistratus wrote “hard though it was, it became soft to 
the semblance of the feminine … though it had no 
power to move, it knew how to leap in Bacchic 
dance.”42 Lifelikeness, something other than mimesis, 
working through a “primordial kind of artistic agency” 
can become so uncanny, that it enters an ecstatic form 
of life, a “psychogenesis of experience”43 beyond the 
rational presence of both viewer and art work.  
Animacy is not limited to Christian icons or ancient 
Greek sculpture, it can occur in 20th Century artworks 
by artists such as Picasso and Rothko. Rothko’s chapel 
paintings in particular blend aesthetic and spiritual 
experience into a cocktail of total perceptual embrace 
and the suspension of critical distance that might be 
described as religious.44 James Elkins shows this 
through the diary notations of the art historian Jane 
Dillenberger and her viewing of the work in Rothko’s 
studio: “At first (she) could barely see. Then, slowly, 
out of the darkness, she found the outlines of several 
huge unfinished canvases. For a minute she stood still, 
looking up and down the height of the paintings. They 
were almost fifteen feet tall, dark and empty like the 
open doorways of some colossal temple. As her eyes 
got used to the half-light, she began to see their 
surfaces—dull, blank, nearly black. She walked up to 
one. It was tar black, veiled with washes of deep 
maroon. The paint was not flat like a wall: you could 
look into it, and it had a kind of watery motion. As she 
stared, the matte canvas moved, and flowered into 
shifting planes of darkness. It was entrancing, and 
perplexing. Rothko remained quiet, even when she 
brought her face up to within a few inches of the 
canvas. Yet there was something in those surfaces, 
something waiting to be seen. They were elusive but 
mysteriously comforting. ‘I felt as if my eyes had 
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fingertips’, she wrote in her journal the next morning, 
‘moving across the brushed textures of the canvases.’ 
The more she stared, the more she felt at home. Then 
she was crying, and the two of them remained that way 
for several minutes: the art historian looking at the 
canvases through a blur of tears, and the painter 
smoking, watching her. It was a moment, she told me, 
of ‘very strange feelings’, but mostly of relief, of perfect 
ease, of pure peacefulness and joy. After a few more 
minutes she dried her eyes and went over to begin the 
interview.”45 
Envisioning 
This kind of discussion of the image outside the 
ordinary everyday relationship of truth and fact reminds 
us that we are still under the sway of primordial images 
and primal relationships to the image that were 
established in prehistoric caves, then temples and 
churches. As Elkins puts it “images are fundamentally a 
religious category”46 since our entire secular tradition of 
image making rests on a massive prehistory of images 
“conceptually inseparable from religious or ritual 
belief.”47 As such “any engagement with the image will 
inevitably evoke its theological history … a time of the 
true image when there was no clear separation 
between the image and the imaged.”48 We relate to the 
‘true image’ not as an artefact or even as an image but 
as a ‘direct passage to Christ’49 or whatever figurehead 
of belief sits behind the most relevant economy of 
revelation. We do not even simply look at the true 
image, the true image or “icon contemplates us”, looks 
back at us.50 
Who looks and what is seen is thrown into an entirely 
unexpected field of relations that brings us back to the 
phone and a user lost in an embrace of looking and 
touching. The mobile phone glows out, shines out of 
itself, looks at us as much as we look at it. We stab the 
screen with fingers and thumbs, dragging and scrolling 
text, photos, video, so what kind of “imageness”51 is 
this? 
To begin with we can say that the phone sits in a 
similar economy of relations as a byzantine icon. It is 
an image of the image, it exists as pure seriality, an 
image of relationality to all other images, now picked 
out by dancing fingers, roaming up and down the 
screen, scrolling through text and image, hyperlinking 
across a network of interrelationships, glowing out of a 
preternatural world of diodes and electronic protocols.  
This kind of imageness is never still, it unfolds 
temporally as a schema of relationality where the act of 
looking is no longer the simple register of vision. The 
technology of our private portable screens has silently 
engendered a new visual presence that reaches out to 
all other kinds of screens, including the traditional 
screen of painting, and the psychological screen of 
dream projection. The way an image appears to us 
through digital formats, is more aptly described in 
Flusser’s terminology as ‘envisioning’52 which he uses to 
combine both the surface of the technology and the 
mode of visual consumption it encourages. In the case 
of the phone it is facilitated by light emitting diodes 
that irradiate the eye, while at the same time 
beckoning touch through an interactive surface. 
We come to look at the world as an envisioned surface, 
as if it were a phone, relationality organised as in the 
design of the phone: framed, multi-layered, interactive, 
temporal, and glowing. Envisioning goes unnoticed 
since it is eclipsed by our everyday practices as we use 
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the phone for a myriad of practical purposes, as a 
“credit card, photo album, compass, map, radio, music 
library, dictionary, camera, video, shop, ride service, 
torch, printing press”53 and so on. The worldliness of 
the phone disguises the radical change it effects in 
relation to the eye, the gaze and the look.  
Because of the mouse and interactive screens, 
attention is extended beyond the visual to where “we 
concentrate more and more on our fingertips.”54 The 
new interfaces enable reaching into a universe of 
particles that “no longer follow the rules”55, into a place 
of “no dimensionality” and the “void of intervals.”56 
There is literally “a transfer of existence to the finger 
tips.”57 where there is no difference “between the 
pressing of a shutter release of the camera and the 
start button of a washing machine.”58  
Like Merleau Ponty and the blind man’s cane, we feel 
our way into a world of images. We finger with our eyes 
to establish a new “visualising gesture”59 of grasping 
images by a digital pointing. As Flusser puts it 
“envisioners are people who raise themselves up 
against the world and point at it with fingertips to 
inform it.”60  
At the same time “the penetrating force of (…) images 
drives their receiver into a corner .. to press keys to 
make images appear.”61 This “scattering into isolation” 
does not produce an asocial person “but one who is 
profoundly socialised in a new sense.”62 They are 
someone who is assembled in private so that they can 
be spread out in public.63 They sit at the end point of a 
system of image radiation at a private ‘terminal’,64 their 
desktop, laptop, tablet or phone. Consequently 
“envisioners stand at the most extreme edge of 
abstraction … in a dimensionless universe.”65 
Technical images 
If so called images on our phones are not yet image or 
more than image, we can use another of Flusser’s 
terms ‘technical images’ to say they are technically not 
images at all. Instead they are symptoms of electronic 
processes driven by a convergence of “visual 
observation, conceptual categorisation and computing 
touch”.66 As such the technical image is not like 
anything that has preceded it, from the cave to the 
cinema, since technical images are facilitated by a 
“swarm of electronic points in a state of decay, closer to 
a yawning emptiness than a physical presence.”67 Two 
other major media theorists, Friedrich Kittler and Lev 
Manovich, tend to agree. Kittler argues that technical 
images have moved out beyond all previous means for 
understanding images, cutting aesthetics, philosophy 
and contemporary art off from the previous age of 
images and their productive or communicative projects. 
While Manovich claims that “the image in the traditional 
sense no longer exists: it is only by habit that we still 
refer to what we see on the real-time screen as 
‘images.’”68  
Consequently images are no longer tied to embodied 
moments of perception, since phenomenal reality does 
not provide the content of the image. Rather the image 
drives a process of continual interpretation and 
judgement, based more on an algorithmic imaginary 
rather than perceptual sets of relations. Technical 
images create a new universe comprised of 
“photographs, films, videos, television screens and 
computer terminals,”70 that are “inherently different 
from earlier pictures.”71 Such images are “not surfaces 
20
but mosaics assembled from particles.”72 They cannot 
be grasped by the hand because they are “particles 
without dimension .. inaccessible to hands eyes or 
fingers. But they can be calculated … by means of 
special apparatus equipped with keys.”73 
The interface between a human face, the place where 
all our senses are concentrated, and the no-
dimensionality of the technical image is the screen. The 
screen is both our way inside the image and a barrier, 
since as Kittler puts it, we are “screened off from our 
computers … to be full of ourselves.”74 Kittler develops 
a back story for our relationship to screens by looking 
at the way the ancient Greeks adapted Phoenician 
script to develop an introspective language based on a 
new writing system. They introduced vowels into a 
consonant system and adopted a sign system that 
“taught the Greeks how they themselves spoke”.75 
Extrapolating on our current situation he suggests that 
“we know nothing about our senses until media provide 
models and metaphors.”’76 If we consider the phone as 
a general writing system for globalised communication 
then there is “no sound, no word, no sentence, no 
thought that cannot be expressed in the writing system 
that belongs to it.”77 Just as the new vowel based 
alphabet of the Greeks enabled them to finally record 
the hexameter’s of Homer, it could also be used 
recursively to indicate not only words, but numbers and 
musical tones.78 This re-functionalisation of letters in 
the Greek language is mirrored by the refunctioning of 
computers in our time away from raw data towards a 
total engagement with the visual. Computers were not 
originally designed for image processing but for 
decoding secret war codes and so for the first ten years 
of the life of the computer “input and output consisted 
of stark columns of numbers.”79 Later came UNIX 
command lines then graphic user interfaces which 
simulated the appearance of an image. Computers were 
born “dimensionless and imageless”80 and as such “do 
not reproduce any extant things, surfaces or spaces at 
all” but reveal to us the nature of a contemporary ‘real’ 
based on a “general interface between systems of 
equations (algorithms) and sensory perception.”81 A 
notion of the contemporary real is captured in the 
transition from alphabets to algorithms where the 
“digital image … coincides with the real precisely 
because it does not want to be a reproduction like the 
conventional arts.”82   
The conventional arts, painting and sculpture, are made 
with the application of manual skill, whereas the 
images that appear on the phone screen arrive as if 
they were not made by human hands, free of producing 
gestures. They are like the Veil of Veronica, 
archeiropoietic83 traces of a disembodied algorithmic 
providence that touches my phone as Christ’s divinity 
marks fabric in a moment of thermo-luminescence. 
What do images want 
At first glance images are generous givers, offering 
something to be seen, they make an invitation to look, 
they become fascinating. Flusser speaks of “the 
magnetic fascination of technical images.”84 Blanchot 
defines fascination as “what happens when the gaze is 
seized (when) what you see (…)  seems to touch you 
with a gripping contact, (…) where what one sees, 
seizes sight.”85 Images bestow fascination as a gift and 
at the same time take hold of us because they want 
something in return. Images want agency, an iconic 
presence, sometimes approaching possession through 
devilry and magic. Technical images are powerful 
agents because they are also “complex computational 
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cultural objects”86 that operate in the space between 
historical visualisations and what we hold in our hand 
as an algorithmic future. Smart phones epitomise this 
because they seem to bypass the issue of image and go 
straight to being an “interface that seeks to facilitate 
thought.”87 Our phones hypnotise us into a state of 
fascination and make us believe we are ‘algorithm 
whisperers’, having “such mastery over the machine 
code that (we) can directly interact with the basic 
operating levels of digital systems without any need for 
intermedia(tion).”88 Algorithm whisperers feel as if they 
are in absolute intimacy with the device. 
This sense of being in a ‘natural’ relationship with the 
phone is facilitated by constantly updating algorithms 
that are part of the “computational quest to continually 
expand the boundary of “effective procedures”89 
available to smart devices. As part of this the phone 
screen is neither surface or image, but an effective 
procedure based on “layers of processes, abstractions 
and interfaces”90 that constantly generate new streams 
of content and connection. Effective procedures 
facilitate the technical image as a menu, a drop down 
list of potential moves, based on conceptual linkages 
and informational hyperlinks, offering a montage of 
possible readings and constantly updating actions that 
move through an infinite regression-procession of 
windows within windows. It has the quality of what 
Plato names Khora “neither present or absent, … both 
amorphous and an infinitely receptive receptacle .. not 
strictly a place, for it is prior to all spatiality.”91 Despite 
the fact we can hold it in our hands it is fundamentally 
without form since “that which is to receive all forms 
should have no form.”92 Everything passes through here 
but nothing is retained, the whole world is made 
available through the phone but it’s fascinating glow 
has become “a neutral directionless gleam which will 
not go out, yet does not clarify.” 
What do technical images make painting do? 
What implications does the technical image have for 
other kinds of image making in particular painting? Is it 
the harbinger of another technology-based regicide of 
our oldest image making discipline? Historically painting 
has made many compromises with potential assassins, 
in particular photography, cinema, television and 
computers. The precedents for the painted image 
bending in relation to new forms of technology are 
many. In 18th Century industrial revolution England, 
the painter George Garrard depicted “a Newtonian 
world of transmitters of power or force: mechanical 
pullies, winches, masts, sails, ropes, wheels and chains 
…. (with) human labour and horses as producers of 
power.”93 In a steam powered 19th Century, Turner 
developed a more recognisable “image in the era of 
industrialism”94 with his painting Rain, Steam and 
Speed (1844) in which he evokes the world 
thermodynamically.95 He sees as if through the eyes of 
a steam engine where heat, temperature, energy and 
work become interchangeable in a cloud of variable 
intensities. Francis Picabia at the beginning of the 20th 
Century and the machine age, developed a literal 
machine aesthetic, as well as a prophetic style of 
layering imagery that evokes the multiplicity of vision in 
the time of photography and cinema.  
In the late 20th Century, at the beginning of the post-
industrial information age, Gerhard Richter’s work 
would seem to be a clear example of photography 
making painting become “photography by another 
means.”96 Yet the most significant element in Richter’s 
painting is not his photorealism but his use of the 
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painterly smear to dissemble the photograph and all 
lens based media, to dissimulate the photographic as 
the ground of every image. In doing so he establishes 
the “power of dissemblance over resemblance”97 since 
the smear deconstructs the photographic, reconstructs 
the painterly, ultimately drawing together both painting 
and photography in iconic tension. In the end Richter 
shows that only painting can reveal the photographic 
and vice versa,“ that the nature of painting or 
photography (is) only (…) graspable in another 
medium.”98  
If painting is revelatory of photography, a technology 
that sought to replace it, can it also tell us something 
about the nature of the contemporary technical image? 
Is it in fact essential for doing so?  If photography 
made Richter blur the painted image, then the mobile 
phone is likely to pull painting away from its traditional 
craft based object status into something technical, 
something only graspable in another medium. If the 
view from a smart phone is a technical image based on 
a menu of drop down options, non-visual protocols and 
a constant push and pull between various media, then 
painting will most likely respond by becoming a 
similarly temporal event that is neither merely figural 
or visual. So if photography made Richter copy and 
paste with an existential blur, then smart phones and 
Facebook make contemporary artists like Jim Lambie 
and Katherine Grosse shift into an expanded field of 
painting where “medium is not defined internally …. but 
is the result of relations between and across media.”99 
As such painting becomes a technical image of itself, 
proliferating through hyper-connectivity with all other 
media and disciplines, continuing to be respectful of its 
craft based history, but finally released from any 
requirement to conform to it. 
Clicking the Icon 
This article has considered the image in many forms, 
from its ontological status, through the metaphysical 
history of the image becoming icon, to the current 
pragmatic presence of the image in its technical digital 
state. As such technical images represent the latest 
stage in the life of the image. Paradoxically all our 
communication devices and their digital screen 
interfaces seem to bring a world of technical images 
into an essential closeness, literally in our face and to 
our fingertips. Yet the nature of these images are not 
more intimate or more easily understood, on the 
contrary, all images have become conceptually and 
phenomenally distant like looking glasses, equipment to 
be looked ‘through’ but not ‘at’. Heidegger’s term for 
this kind of experience is de-severance.100 He argues 
that we are essentially de-severant beings, since we 
are always tearing things away from an undifferentiated 
environment and placing them in an existential 
proximity so as to understand them, bringing them 
closer and into a personal field of concerns.  
At a mundane level distant things can be existentially 
close and close things can be existentially distant. For 
example when looking at a painting, my glasses are 
closest to me, right there on the tip of my nose, yet 
“they are environmentally more remote than the 
picture on the wall.”101 Such equipment, my glasses, 
“has so little closeness that often it is proximally quite 
impossible to find.”102 That is to say I can be looking for 
them and not realise I am actually wearing them. At 
the same time I can be gazing into my phone and not 
realise my device has “so expanded (the) everyday 
environment that it has accomplished a de-severance of 
the (entire) ‘world’”103 World deseverance “brings into 
play unlimited power for calculating, planning and 
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moulding of all things.”104 Through a deseverance of 
distance and quantity, the gigantic rushes forwards, 
from an enormous distance, from a great point of 
removal, where it enters as an absolute closeness. By 
treating technical images ontologically, that is whether 
they are existentially close or distant, rather than as 
visual phenomena, they suddenly appear more as 
optical holes instead of shimmering presences. The 
smart phone is one such hole that comes to reveal the 
hidden but gigantic nature of our global technologies of 
envisioning, bringing with it an annihilating distance 
which flings us existentially to the greatest point of 
removal beyond embodied experiences and discursive 
formations.  
Through the gigantic reach of global communication 
technologies, everything physically distant has been 
desevered, brought close by virtue of our calculating 
machines. No longer tied to main frames, they have 
been progressively miniaturised so that we can hold 
them in our hands or wear them. They facilitate 
envisioning as a way of bringing things closer, towards 
the “conquest of (all) remoteness”,105 while quietly 
running the risk of never being able to see or visualize 
what is most important to us, what is closest: the 
ineffable, truth, love, community. In the age of 
unlimited calculation, even the distant gods have been 
brought near, their brilliance shines out from the glow 
of our screens. By virtue of a new kind of animacy our 
devices have invited them back across impossible 
existential distances of time and space. All of this takes 
place in a conceptual space beyond what might be 
called the truth of the image. Captured by the image in 
a moment of fascination, there is a different kind of 
satisfaction than the one derived from analysing and 
understanding. In gazing at our phones, as we would a 
Byzantine icon, we shuttle between looking and 
touching, creating a visual precinct that has no frame 
or limiting structure. In order to contain this precinct, 
akin to Borges’s Aleph, “a body larger than the heavens 
is required, a space for something that does not have 
any, a place for something that is everywhere, a 
visibility for something that no one can see” is required.
106 If the phone does this kind of work for us it is 
important to remember something about its thingly 
nature. Every image, whether it be formed by paint or 
liquid crystal, has its own physicality, which drives 
forward with the innate creativity of matter, half dumb, 
half divine, demanding to be looked at so as to bestow 
its own kind of visual grace. The digital screen has 
become the place where all our images appear, it is a 
kind of theatre, in that is both an actual space that we 
attend and touch with our hands while at the same 
time it is a place where everything is made unreal, a 
stage of disappearance, an inexistence where we 
connect to the world and others in our specific and 
complete isolation. It is a screen that no longer 
screens, it allows everything to pass through without 
limit, it is a surface permeable to light, such that even 
the act of looking has been incorporated within its 
powers of incarnation. 
In the contemporary empire of technical images the 
phone blesses our looking with an iconic aura. 
Stretched between icon and idolatry the phone has 
become an infamous model of all intelligibility and 
visuality, an image of our contemporary beliefs. In that 
intimate embrace with the screen, somewhere between 
looking and being looked at, "for an instant the 
brilliance of divinity happens to fall on a mortal 
creature, illuminating (us) as in a fleeting glow, with a 
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little of that splendour that always clothes the body of a 
god."107 
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